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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. (together
"Maple Grove") appeal from the District Court's dismissal of their lawsuit against the Ada
County Highway District ("ACHD"). Maple Grove claims business damages from ACHD under
Idaho Code 9 7-71 l(2) based upon the taking of real property ("Project Property") that ACHD
needed for its Ustick Road widening project in Boise ("Project").
At its heart, this case presents a question of first impression under Idaho law: is an
established business entitled to bring an action to recover damages caused by a taking of adjacent
property by a governmental entity? The Idaho Legislature's plainly expressed intent requires an
affirmative answer. Moreover, this Court has already rejected an effort to place requirements
upon a qualifying business to recover such damages beyond the elements of the applicable
statute. Once it is confirmed that an established business may assert its claim, it is a short road to
the conclusion that Maple Grove satisfies the elements of the statute. On the other hand, even if
this Court decides that an established business does not have a right to bring such a claim, then
Maple Grove is still entitled to recover because it has demonstrated a taking of a property interest
sufficient to support an inverse condemnation action.
11.

A.

ARGUMENT

An Established Business Can Bring an Action for Damages under Idaho Code $ 7 711(2).
Idaho Code 9 7-71 l(2) provides that "any business qualifying under this subsection

having more than five (5) years' standing" is entitled to compensation for damages "which a
taking of a portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in the manner

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 1

proposed by the [government entity] may reasonably cause." A qualifying business "must be
owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned
or held by such party."
In City ofMcCall v. Seubert, this Court upheld a straightforward interpretation of these
statutory provisions against the city's argument that the businesses needed to prove an interest in
the property being taken:

. . . [T]he City's argument that an interest in remaining on the land
sufficient to claim business damages must be proven by a written
lease or agreement attempts to import a requirement into the statute
that does not exist. A business need only meet the statutory
requirements of I.C. 7-711 in order to make a claim for
damages resulting from the taking of the underlying property.
"The right to receive business damages . . . resulting from a taking
of land is strictly a statutory right . . . ." 29A C.J.S. Eminent
Domain 5 150 (2004).
City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,584,130 P.3d 1118, 1122 (2006) (emphasis added).
ACHD does not dispute that an established business can assert a claim for business
damages under I.C. § 7-71 l(2) where an eminent domain proceeding has been initiated by the
governmental entity or an inverse condemnation action has been filed by the owner of the real
property. Instead, ACHD's position is that an established business cannot recover damages in
situations where the governmental entity is able to negotiate the purchase of the property. I
This Court is familiar with the standards for statutory construction.

' This is apparently the District Court's view as well. Although the court did not explicitly
address the implied right of action issue, it consistently treated Maple Grove's claims as inverse
condemnation claims. See R., p. 104 ("Dr. Klure is required to establish that ACHD has
engaged in a 'taking' of his interest in the property.").
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When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give
force and effect to the legislature's intent in passing the statute.
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870
P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal words of
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole."
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 8 10, 813, 135
P.3d 756,759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction."
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).
However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must engage
in statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory
construction, this Court has a "duty to ascertain the legislative
intent, and give effect to that intent." Id. "[Tlhe Court must
construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the
legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal
citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all other
matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations
and the policy behind the statute." Id.

Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,263,207 P.3d 988,994 (2009).
7-71 1(2) undeniably allows a qualifying business to recover damages caused by a taking.
ACHD's interpretation of Idaho's eminent domain statute would create a right without a remedy
in matters in which the government is able to negotiate a purchase of the property. It would
leave established business owners at the mercy of the condemning entity and the property owner.

A governmental entity would be encouraged to overpay for the real property in order to cut off
the right of any qualifying business to make a claim. This proposed interpretation conflicts with
the intent of the Idaho Legislature, which was to provide compensation to qualifjring business
owners who are affected by public takings.

APPELLANTS'
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The ability of an established business to assert its claim for damages under I.C.

5

7-

71 l(2) is confirmed by Idaho Code 5 7-709. That section provides:
A11 persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in,
any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages
for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead, and
defend each in respect to his own property or interest, or that
claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint.
An established business that meets the requirements of I.C.

5

7-711(2) is a person with an

interest in the damages for the taking of the property and therefore may "appear, plead and
defend" to the same extent as if they had been named in a complaint for condemnation.
Maple Grove ;oncedes that the statute does not explicitly provide for the filing of a
complaint by a qualifying business owner, but it does not provide for the filing of a complaint by
the property owner, either. This Court has repeatedly recognized a property owner's right to
initiate an inverse condemnation action. To deny a qualifying business an opportunity to assert
its claim for damages on the ground that the governmental entity was able to negotiate a
purchase of the real property inserts requirements into the statute that do not exist, renders
portions of LC.

3

7-71 l(2) superfluous, and is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the

legislature to provide compensation to qualifying businesses.
There is no requirement in 7-71l(2) or 7-709 that a qualifying business also possess an
interest in a portion of the property being condemned, which is precisely the requirement that
ACHD seeks to impose. Indeed, such a requirement would contradict the plain language of
those statutes and is exactly the same argument rejected by this Court in Seubert. A business
may qualify for damages by virtue of being adjacent to the condemned property. A person has
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standing to appear, plead, or defend by having an interest in the damages arising from the
taking. If a qualifying business must also be an owner of the property being condemned in order
to assert such a claim, then those portions of the statutes are unnecessary.
Finally, there is no logical reason that the Idaho Legislature would have intended to
condition its grant of a right to damages to a qualifying business upon the inability of the
government to negotiate a purchase of the property.2 The Idaho Legislature, having provided a
right to damages for qualifying businesses, must also be presumed to have intended those
qualifying businesses to be able to assert their claims without being dependent upon an action
brought by the government or the property owner. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized more
than ninety years ago that "if the plaintiff can show that the [statutory] duty was imposed for his
benefit, and that the Legislature had in mind his protection in passing the act in question, and
intended to give him a vested right in the discharge of that duty, then this will give him such an
interest as will support an action." State v. American Surety Co. of New York, 26 Idaho 652,671,
I45 P. 1097, 1102-03 (1914).

More recently, this Court said, "When a statute is silent regarding private enforcement,
courts may recognize a private right only when it is necessary to assure effectiveness of the
statute." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 926, 908 P.2d 1228, 1233 (1995),
(citing White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101,730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986)). In both

Foster and White, this Court concluded that the criminal statutes at issue did not provide for a

This is particularly true given the fact that the legislature requires a governmental entity to
negotiate in good faith as a prerequisite to a condemnation action.

private right of action because civil remedies were available elsewhere. Here, we have precisely
the situation contemplated by the test described in Foster and White - I.C.

5 7-71 l(2) is silent

regarding private enforcement by a qualifying business in the absence of an eminent domain
action, but the ability of a qualifying business to bring an action for compensation is necessary to
assure the effectiveness of the statute and to implement the intent of the Legislature.
Florida's eminent domain statute is similar to Idaho's statute in that it provides for an
award of damages to qualifying businesses and only provides for the commencement of an action
by the government. Fla.Stat. Section 73.07(3)(b). In State Dept. of Transp. v. Crews, 227 So.2d
505,506 (F1a.Dist.Ct.A~~.
1969), the court held that a lessee had an independent right to bring a
claim for business damages despite the fact that the lessee was not a party to the principal action
for condemnation of the property.
As this Court recognized in Seubert, an action for business damages resulting from a
taking of private property for a public use is a statutory ~reation.~
The Idaho Legislature adopted
a provision that allows an established business to recover damages caused by a taking of adjacent
property or the property upon which it is located. Regardless of whether the governmental entity
files an eminent domain action or negotiates a purchase of the needed property, a qualifying
business must be permitted to bring an action for damages caused by the taking.

As opposed to a claim for just compensation for a taking of an interest in property, which is
rooted in the constitution.
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B.

Maple Grove is Entitled to Recover its Business Damages.
Maple Grove is a qualifying business under I.C. 9 7-711(2).

1.

Having determined that an established business is entitled to bring an action for damages
under I.C.

5

7-71 1(c), the next question is whether Maple Grove meets the elements of the

statute. The first requirement is that the business must have been in operation for more than five
years. It is undisputed that Maple Grove operated in its location at the intersection of Maple
Grove and Ustick for more than ten years. Therefore, the only question is whether Maple Grove
was "owned by the party whose lands [were] being condemned or [was] located upon adjoining
lands owned or held by such party." I . .

7-711(2)(b). ACI-ID does not dispute that Maple

Grove was owned by the party whose property was purchased by ACHD. The Settlement
Agreement reflects that the real property purchased by ACHD was owned by Dr. Curtis, who
was an equal partner with Dr. Klure in Maple Grove. See Seubert, 142 Idaho at 580, 584, 130
P.3d 1118, 1122 (company qualified under 7-711(2) where its majority shareholder was the
owner of the condemned property). In addition, Maple Grove was located upon land owned by
Dr. Curtis adjacent to the Project Property. Id. (second company qualified under 7-711(2)
because it was located on remaining property owned by Seubert and was adjacent to the
condemned portion).

2.

A sale under threat of condemnation is a taking.

ACHD attempts to avoid its statutory responsibility to compensate Maple Grove by
claiming that LC. § 7-71 l(c) does not apply because there was no taking of any of Dr. Curtis's

APPELLANTS'
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property. Instead, ACHD describes its purchase of the property owned by Dr. Curtis as a
"negotiated, arms-length transaction . . . ." Respondent's Brief, p. 1 9 . ~ Maple Grove's opening
brief cited several authorities declaring that a sale in lieu of condemnation is equivalent to a
taking. ACHD's attempts to distinguish these authorities fall flat.
ACHD acknowledges that, in P.C. Management, Inc. v. Page Two, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 434,
437 (Ind. App. 1991), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a conveyance in lieu of actual
condemnation constitutes a condemnation proceeding. ACHD makes much of the fact that the
court then refused to award damages to a plaintiff whose sublease had expired. Respondent's
Brief, p. 24. The fact that the sublessee was unable to recover damages was the result of the
specific terms of the lease at issue in that case. Regardless of the outcome, the Indiana Court of
Appeals explicitly approved of the principle that a negotiated sale of property was tantamount to
a taking.
ACHD next attempts to distinguish Fuddy Duddy's v. State Dept. ofTvansp., 950 P.2d
773,775 (Nev. 1997), in which the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a purchase made
under the threat of condemnation is the same as a judicial condemnation. ACHD argues that it
could not have acquired the office building through eminent domain, but it does not (and indeed
The District Court found 7-71 1(c) inapplicable for the same reason. "Maple Grove
Dentistry was a business which was in operation for over ten years so it met the requirement of
having more than five years standing. Dr. Klure was a half-owner of Maple Grove Dentistry.
However, the property was not taken by ACHD. It was sold by Dr. Curtis." R, p. 106. Later in
the same discussion, the court said, "The reason ACHD acquired the Maple Grove Dentistry
building is because of the voluntary, arms-length sale of it by the property owner, Dr. Curtis."
Id. at 107. The District Court's analysis is off the mark because it focuses upon the sale of the
building owned by Dr. Curtis where Maple Grove operated its dental practice rather than the
strip of land along Ustick that was actually used for the road widening project.

-
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cannot) argue that the same was true of the Project Property. ACHD also points out that the
government in Fuddy Duddy's had passed a condemnation resolution while no such action was
taken here by ACHD. This argument is disingenuous at best. The undisputed facts in the record
show that the Project was well underway by the time the Settlement Agreement was reached in
June 2007. In fact, construction had already begun pursuant to the Right of Way Agreement that
was executed in November 2006. See R., Exh. 7, (Price Aff.,

71 17,20,43). While it may be

true that ACHD never passed a resolution directing the condemnation of Dr. Curtis's property,
there is no doubt that a threat of condemnation existed because the Project Property would have
been condemned if ACHD and Dr. Curtis had not been able to reach an agreement.
In Lanning v. City of Monterey, 226 Cal.Rptr. 258,262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the
California Court of Appeals found that a sale of property to a city was the essential equivalent of
its exercise of eminent domain. ACHD notes that the sales agreement in Lanning expressly
acknowledged that the sale was in lieu of condemnation. Here, the Settlement Agreement says
exactly the same thing even though it does not use the words "in lieu of condemnation," as can
be seen in the following excerpts.
WHEREAS, in connection with the Project, ACE-ID needs to acquire a portion of
each of the Office Parcel, Parcel 45 and Parcel 44; and

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 9

In exchange for a full and complete release by Curtis, including their
B.
interest .in Curtis-Klure, and in full and complete settlement of all claims by Curtis,
arising from or relating in any way to the Project and/or the sale and acquisition by
ACHD of the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C hereto, including any and all
claims for damages of any kind or nature whatsoever, and specifically including claims
for business damages under Idaho Code $ 7-71 1, relocation expenses, and any other
damage claims, and including claims for attorney fees and costs, ACHD shalI pay the
following sums:

R., Exh. 6, (Klure Aff., 7 8). These provisions reflect the fact that the transfer of property from
Dr. Curtis to ACHD was not a voluntary sale but instead was part of a negotiated resolution of
Dr. Curtis's claims arising from ACHD's acquisition of the property, including specifically Dr.

Curtis's share of Curtis-Klure's (Maple Grove's) business damages under 7-711. If the
transaction was simply a standard purchase of real estate, then why were these provisions
necessary and why was Dr. Curtis compensated for his share of Maple Grove's business
damages?
ACHD attempts to distinguish Vincent v. Redev. Auth., Etc., 487 A.2d 1024, 1025
(Pa.Commw.Ct. 1985), in which the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a conveyance
in lieu of condemnation constituted a condemnation proceeding, on the same basis as Fuddy

Duddy's and Lanning. Nevertheless, the test adopted by the Vincent court was whether the
events were "part of a proceeding which was directed toward condemnation, and which, indeed,
would have resulted in the same but for the conveyance of the property by deed." Id This test is
easily satisfied in the present case.
To counter the authorities cited by Maple Grove, ACHD cites several cases allegedly
demonstrating that the acquisition of the Project Property should not be considered a taking.

APPELLANTS'REPLY BRIEF- I0

However, none of these cases undercut the principle that a sale under threat of condemnation is a
taking.
First and foremost, the bulk of cases cited by ACHD do not involve a sale to a
government entity. ACHD proves nothing by referencing cases in which negotiations501

threat^,^ standing alone, were held insufficient to constitute a taking.

Maple Grove has never

argued that such actions resulted in a taking of its property. Rather, a taking occurred because
ACHD's actions resulted in its acquisition of Dr. Curtis's property, which would never have
happened at all if not for the road widening project. Absent an actual transfer of property under
threat of condemnation, the cases cited by ACHD provide no guidance.
Other cases are inapplicable because the property was not acquired under threat of
condemnation. ACHD discusses two Texas cases at length, but the alleged threat of
condemnation in these cases arose after the contract had been executed. Gen. Serv. Comm h v.

Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. 2001); State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639,
641 (Tex. 2007). There were no sales under threat of condemnation; rather, each plaintiff argued
that the state committed a taking when it rejected a claim for additional compensation under the
contract. Id. This fact pattern has no bearing on the present case, where the purchase of the
Project Parcel was clearly preceded by a threat of condemnation. Texas courts have held that
such purchases are equivalent to a taking. See, e.g.,Schriver v. Tex. Dept. of Transp.,293

Stahelin v. Forest Preserve Dist. of DuPage County, 877 N.E.2d 1211 (Ill. 2007); Eckhoffv.
Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 36 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1941); Ferrari v. US., 73 Fed.Cl. 219
$2006); B. W. Parkway Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. US.,29 Fed.Cl. 669 (1993).
Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. US., 98 F.Supp. 572 (Fed. Ct. C1. 1951); US. v.
Sponenbarger, 208 U.S. 256 (1939); Danforth v. US., 308 U.S. 271 (1939).

S.W.3d 846,850 (Tex. App. 2009) ("a governmental entity cannot claim immunity from a
landowner's claim for adequate compensation under [the takings clause] of the Texas
Constitution, by contracting to purchase the property for a public purpose before initiating
eminent domain proceedings"); City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 800 (Tex. App.
2007) (rejecting argument that "because the iplaintiffs] voluntarily entered into an agreement
with the City, they should not be allowed to now assert that the City has taken or attempted to
take their property by eminent domain").
ACHD also summarizes two California cases, but these are distinguishable because the
California Court of Appeal expressly found no evidence of any intent to condemn. Instead, both
cases provided examples of open market transactions that were different from a sale under an
implied or explicit threat of condemnation. Respondent's Brief at 32-35 (discussing Pacific

Outdoor Adver. Co. v. City of Burbank, 149 Cal.Rptr. 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) and Langer v.
Redev. Agency, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). These cases are very helpful in
demonstrating the difference between governmental entities engaging in a commercial
transaction versus attempting to avoid paying condemnation damages by privately acquiring
property.
In the Pacific Outdoor case, the city negotiated a lease of railroad property for the
purposes of beautification and parking. As a result of the city lease, the railroad terminated
existing leases with Pacific Outdoor for the placement of billboards. The Pacific Outdoor leases
were terminable upon 24 hours' notice. Both the trial court and the appeals court found that no
taking of Pacific Outdoor's interest in the billboard leases had occurred because there was no

-

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 12

evidence that the city intended to condemn the property in the absence of the agreement with the
railroad. The appeals court discussed prior cases in which an intent to condemn was present as
follows.
In both Diamond Properties and Concrete Service there is a
definite and unequivocal manifestation that the public entity in
question was ready to use its power to condemn, and in fact would
clearly do so if necessary, to acquire the property at issue. Not only
has Pacific failed to establish such a "calculated anem~t"by
Burbank, but all evidence is to the contrary. The personal property
of Pacific was neither taken nor damaged by the respondent. The
Railroad terminated the licenses held by the appellant, and it did so
solely upon the motive of financial and other benefits which it
foresaw as a result of leasing the said property to Burbank.
Lacking an intent, or even an indication to condemn, the city was
dealing in an open market transaction with the Railroad, and we
are not ready to hold that a public entity is always liable for
damages in an inverse condemnation suit when it concludes
transactions in the open market.

Id. at 910. In the instant case, there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that Dr.
Curtis would have sold his property (including the Project Property) if not for the Project. Dr.
Curtis sold out because his only other choice was to have the Project Property condemned and to
litigate the issues of just compensation, remainder damages and business damages.
The Pacific Outdoor court included in a footnote the trial court's discussion of this issue
at a hearing, which is particularly illuminating.
"The Court: I think that has to be shown in a case like this. It was
at least likely there would be a condemnation. In other words, to
have inverse condemnation, you have to have a taking. A
transaction that a city has with an outside vendor is not necessarily
a taking. Cities, like other bodies, municipal and corporate, can do
business without using their condemnation power. If, for example,
this property, as I said, it was in the path of a bridge, or a freeway,
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or something else, which, although there was no resolution, it was
inferrable from the circumstances that they were going to go
forward with it anyway, no matter what would have happened, I
would say your argument would apply, but we don't have that in
the record."

Id.,

m 4.
Here, we have exactly the situation described by the trial court judge in Paczfic Outdoor -

regardless of whether a resolution was adopted or an action was filed, the facts are undisputed
that the Ustick widening project was going forward and would require a strip of Dr. Curtis's
property adjacent to Maple Grove's building. Under these circumstances, there can only be one
conclusion - that the acquisition of the property that was utilized for the Project was a taking.
The analysis in Langer is consistent. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that they were
entitled to damages resulting from the termination of their leases pursuant to a development
agreement between their landlord and a private developer. The developer had a separate
agreement with the local redevelopment agency to provide hnding for the project. The court
denied the tenants' claims for compensation because the agency never intended to condemn and
never acquired the property at issue. The acquisition of the parcels upon which the plaintiffs'
businesses were located was a matter of contract between the landlord and the developer.
Applying this case law to the undisputed facts before us,
we find there was no substantial equivalent of condemnation here.
Appellants contend the evidence shows that the Agency
"orchestrated" the termination of the leases, similar to the
circumstances in Diamond Properties, where the public agency
privately purchased the property on the condition that the owner
terminate the tenancies. Diamond Properties is quite different,
however. In that case it was clear that the public entity intended to
use its power of condemnation and in fact actually filed a
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condemnation action, which it later dismissed. The private
purchase by the entity, conditioned on delivery of the property free
of tenancies, was therefore clearly in lieu of condemnation.
Here, on the other hand, the evidence shows that the plans
for developing the properties were initiated by Cypress and
Scherer, who sought assistance from the Agency in acquiring other
properties in the area. The Agency never acquired the Scherer
properties. Unlike Concrete Service, Diamond Properties and
Lanning, there was no notice of condemnation nor any threat of
condemnation of the Scherer properties, nor any evidence that the
Agency intended to condemn those properties for redevelopment
of the area. Indeed, in all of the owner participation agreements,
the Scherer properties were in the group of parcels which were
already under the control of Cypress and thus did not require
acquisition by the Agency.

There is no question here that ACHD intended to acquire the Project Property and
therefore acquired it under threat of condemnation. In such cases, the California courts routinely
hold that a taking has occurred. See, e.g., Lanning, 226 Cal.Rptr. at 262; Concrete Service Co. v.

Dept. of Public Works, Div. of Highways, 78 Ca1.Rptr. 923,926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (where
agency unequivocally expressed intention to take property for freeway purposes, negotiated sale
constituted condemnation or its substantial equivalent); Redev. Agency of City of Stockton v.

Diamond Prop., 76 Cal.Rptr. 269,272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (agency acted as condemnor where,
after filing condemnation complaint, it induced property owner to terminate plaintiffs tenancy as
condition of purchase).
Only one case cited by ACHD involved a sale under threat of condemnation, and even
this case is inapplicable. In Knop v. Gardner Edgerton UnifiedSch. Dist. No. 231,205 P.3d 755
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(Kan. Ct. App. 2009), the plaintiffs sold their property to a school district in order to avoid
eminent domain proceedings. Less than two years later, the school district chose not to build a
school and instead sold the property to a developer for a profit of approximately one million
dollars. A Kansas statute provided, in relevant part:

I t within 10 years after entry of final judgment under K.S.A.
26-511, and amendments thereto, the school district fails to
construct substantial buildings or improvements that are used for
school purposes on any real property acquired under this
subsection, the school district shall notify the original owners or
their heirs or assigns that they have an option to purchase the
property from the school district for an amount equal to the
compensation awarded for the property under the eminent domain
procedures act.
K.S.A.2008 Supp. 72-8212a(a) (emphasis added). When the plaintiffs attempted to enforce this
statutory right, their claim was rejected because there had been no "entry of final judgment" in
an eminent domain proceeding. The Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledged "the perceived
inequities presented by the outcome," but it could not circumvent the statutory language. Knop,
205 P.3d at 766. Although the court distinguished between acquisitions under a threat of
condemnation and acquisitions via "entry of a final judgment" for the purposes of the specific
statute at issue, it never held that an acquisition under a threat of condemnation is not a taking
Consequently, Knop provides no support for ACHD's proposition that a negotiated sale of
property that would otherwise be the subject of an eminent domain action should not be
considered the equivalent of a taking for the purpose of applying I.C.

5 7-71 l(2).

There is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that the Project Property was sold to
ACHD under threat of condemnation. The first correspondence sent to Dr. Curtis from ACHD
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explained that "this project will affect your property located within the project boundaries," then
went on to describe the property acquisition process. R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at 1 35, Exh. H).
This letter was also accompanied by a document entitled "SUMMARY OF THE RIGHTS OF
AN OWNER WHEN ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT SEEKS TO ACQUIRE
PROPERTY THROUGH ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN." Id.
Later, the Right of Entry Agreement executed by Dr. Curtis and ACHD on November 10,

2006 unequivocally stated: "In order to complete the Project it will be necessary for ACHD to
acquire the ... [plemaneni easement on, over and across the real property as described on
Exhibit 'B'," which included the Project Property. Id. (Price Aff. at 1 43,Exh. I, Section 1.2).
The Right of Entry Agreement further provided that it would terminate only upon sale of the
property, entry of an order of condemnation or the passage of two years, unless a condemnation
action was pending. Id at Section 3.
None of Dr. Curtis's property was for sale prior to the Project. Maple Grove intended to
remain in its original location and would have done so were it not for the Project. R., Exh. 6
(Klure Aff. at 1 7); Exh. 9 (Klure Second Aff. at 14).
Finally, ACHD's general counsel testified that "[bly reaching the settlement agreement
with Dr. Curtis for the purchase of his Property, ACHD accomplished its goal of acquiring
property by agreement, rather than though condemnation." R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at 1 52).
3.

The fact that Dr. Kiure Relocated his Practice in April 2007 is Immaterial.

ACHD also contends that Maple Grove is not entitled to assert a claim for business
damages under 7-71l(2) because, even if a taking of a portion of Dr. Curtis's property occurred,
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Dr. Klure had already relocated his practice and any interest that he had in the subject property
had terminated. This is wrong on the facts, as will be discussed below. It also ignores the
purpose of the business damages provision in 7-71 1(2), which is to compensate qualifying
businesses that are displaced by public projects, regardless of the technical legal status on the
date of the transfer of the property. This Court addressed this issue in Seubert.
The City argues Intervenors are not entitled to business
damages under I.C. 3 7-711 because they have no legally
compensable interest in the underlying property. Because they do
not own the property and do not have a written lease or agreement
with Seubert to remain on the land, the City contends Intervenors
have a mere unilateral expectation to continue to use the property
or, at-most, a month-to-month lease.
At the outset, this Court notes that the City's
characterization of Intervenors as mere lessees with no right to
remain on the property ignores the factual circumstances of this
case, i.e., for over a decade, the Seubert family has made
substantial expenditures of time and money to build and maintain
the asphalt and concrete plants on the Seubert property in order to
capitalize on the sub-surface sand and mineral deposits. The City
offers no evidence that these family-run businesses will not
continue on the Seubert property for the indefinite future.
142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 1122
Maple Grove stands in the same position as Valley and Cleanvater in Seubert. Maple
Grove operated at the same location for more than ten years and would have continued to operate
at that location until its principals retired but for the decision of ACHD to widen Ustick Road.
The bottom line is that ACHD's acquisition of Dr. Curtis's property that was needed for the
Ustick Road widening project was the equivalent of a taking for purposes of 7-711(2), and Maple

-
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Grove, as a qualifying business located on, or adjacent to, the condemned property, is entitled to
recover the damages that it can prove were caused by the Project.
C.

Maple Grove Had a Property Interest at the Time of the Taking.
Even if this Court holds that a qualifying business does not have the ability to bring an

action for damages under 7-71 1(2), and instead must prove the elements of an inverse
condemnation claim, Maple Grove is still entitled to recover its damages because it had a
property interest in the land that was effectively condemned by ACHD.
1.

The record indicates that Maple Grove's lease was still in effect on June 22,

2007.
ACHD insists that no taking occurred prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement
on June 22,2007. Accordingly, ACHD repeatedly states that Dr. Klure did not have any interest
in the subject property as of June 2007 because he vacated the Office Property in April 2007.
Respondent's Brief, p. 1 ("Both the lease and the partnership ended in April 2007 when Dr.
Klure left to practice at another location."), p. 2 ("Klure vacated the premises in April of 2007,
ending the partnership and his month-to-month holdover tenancy under the expired lease."), pp.
6-7 (Prior to [June 22,20071, Klure had decided to terminate his partnership with Dr. Curtis and
relocate his practice."), p. 8 ("Klure had vacated the Dentist Office Property in April of 2007,
ending his partnership with Dr. Curtis and ending his holdover tenancy of the lease on the
Dentist Office Property that expired December 3 1,2006.").
All of these statements are unsupported by the record and are misleading. ACHD
deliberately refers to Dr. Klure as an individual claimant, despite knowing that both the claim for
business damages under 7-71 l(2) and the leasehold interest belong to Maple Grove. ACHD's

allegation that the Maple Grove partnership terminated prior to June 2007 is pure fiction. The
record shows that Maple Grove's lease terminated effective with the execution of the Settlement
Agreement, which states that "the Curtis-Klure leases of the Office Parcel and other parcels
described on Exhibits A, B and C will be terminated prior to closing." R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at
Ex. J, Section H) (emphasis added).
In fact, the Settlement Agreement indicates that the lease and partnership were still in
effect: "Dr. Klure, who leases and shares the office space in the Office Parcel as a member of
Curtis-Klure, has no ownership interest in the Office Parcel or any common areas adjacent
thereto." Id (emphasis added). The use of the present-tense "leases and shares" establishes the
existence of an ongoing lease. Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement declares only that Dr.
Klure had no "ownership interest"; it does not declare that he had no leasehold interest. If Dr.
Klure, via Maple Grove, had no remaining interest in the property, and the partnership was no
more, then why was Dr. Klure a party to the Settlement Agreement at all? Why did ACI-ID pay
Dr. Curtis for his share of Maple Grove's business damages?

2.

The taking began when ACHD invaded the Project Property in November

2006.
Idaho law recognizes that a taking is established when a government entity permanently
invades or interferes with a property interest. In City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,853
P.2d 596 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993), the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for inverse
condemnation, finding that no taking occurred until the city filed an eminent domain action. The
Idaho Court of Appeals upheld this determination, but its rationale is worthy of examination.
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First, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that no compensation was available for takings
that occur prior to issuance of a summons for an eminent domain action:
[I]f we were to construe the statute to prohibit compensation for
takings which occur prior to the date of summons in eminent
domain proceedings, it would effectively abolish the right to obtain
the relief sought in inverse condemnation actions. This is because
"the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the
proposition that a taking may occur without such formal
proceedings."

I d , 123 Idaho at 857,853 P.2d at 602 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,316,107 S.Ct. 2378,2386 (1987)). The Court of Appeals
went on to explain that, although it agreed that no taking occurred in that case before the city
instituted eminent domain proceedings, its determination was "predicated on the court's factual
finding that the City never interfered with [the plaintiffs] use of her property prior to that date."

I d , 123 Idaho at 858,853 P.2d at 603.
Several other jurisdictions have likewise held that a taking occurs when a govemment
entity permanently invades or interferes with a property interest. See, e.g., Clay County Realty

Co. v. City of Gladstone, 254 S.W.3d 859,864 (Mo. 2008) (landowner need not show physical
taking where an invasion or appropriation of property right can be shown); Rose v. City oj

Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d 522 (Neb. 1989) (taking occurs when govemment entity exercises
dominion over or appropriates an interest in private property); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.

Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 924,540 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Wash. 1975) (invasion of private
lands causing permanent or recurring damage constitutes unconstitutional taking); Klopping v.

City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Cal. 1972) (de facto taking occurs upon physical invasion

or direct legal restraint); City ofBuffa20 v. J: W Clement Co., 253,269 N.E.2d 895,902 (N.Y.
1972) (direct invasion of property or direct legal restraint on its use constitutes de facto taking).
In this case, ACHD concedes that it invaded the Project Property long before Dr. Klure
moved his practice. Respondent's Brief at 16 ("[Dr.] Klure and Dr. Curtis continued their
practices for some months during construction of the Project and while ACHD physically
occupied the strip of land needed for the Project"). This invasion or interference was pennanent;
ACHD occupied the Project Property until it acquired title thereto. Thus, the appropriate date of
taking for the Project Property is approximately November 2006, well before Maple Grove's
leasehold interest was te~minated.~
3.

Maple Grove had an interest in the Project Property.

Because Maple Grove was located upon lands adjoining the Project Property, it is not
required to prove a taking of its property interest in order to establish a right to business
damages. LC. 3 7-71 l(2). Nevertheless, Maple Grove had the right to use the Project Property
for ingress, egress and parking, and it received no compensation from ACHD when this right
was taken for a public use. See R., Exh. 8 at 7 3 (providing that Lots 17 through 20 have a

ACHD also refers repeatedly to the fact that the Maple Grove lease was not renewed and
therefore converted to a month-to-month lease as of December 31,2006. This is hardly
surprising or significant. The Ustick widening project commenced in 2005. R., Exh. 7 (Price
Aff., 7 17.) By early 2006, it was clear that ACHD needed to acquire some of Dr. Curtis's
property for the project. Id., 77 34-36. ACHD entered the Project Property and started
construction in November 2006. There was no reason to renew the lease at the end of 2006
because, by that time, both Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure knew that they would have to move their
practices.
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nonexclusive easement over Lot 16 for various uses, including ingress, egress and parking). This
is also reflected in the Settlement Agreement executed by ACHD.
WHEREAS, Curtis-Klure, PLLC dba Maple Grove Dentistry ("Curtis-Klure") is
equally owned by Dr. Curtis and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. ("Dr. Klure") and has leased the
Office Parcel with concurrent rights in Parcels 44 and 45 from Curtis Tor operation of its
dental practice since 1997; and

R., Exh. 6 (Klure Aff., Exh. 2).
Winn-DixieStores, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 839 So.2d 727, 730 (Fla.App.2 Dist., 2003),
confirms that a taking occurs when a leasehold interest in common areas is taken without
compensation. ACHD attempts to distinguish Winn-Dixie from the present case, but its
arguments are without merit. ACHD first points out that Winn-Dixie involved a condemnation
action, but, as discussed above, a sale in lieu of condemnation is equivalent to a condemnation
action. ACHD claims that Maple Grove lacked a property interest at the time of the taking, but
this is also &ong. Finally, ACHD notes that the lease in Winn-Dixie expressly addressed
parking, including a separate fee for maintenance. Although Maple Grove's lease did not
address parking, common sense dictates that parking was one of the benefits bargained for by
Maple Grove. The building would have no value as a professional office unless there was an
appurtenant right to access and parking in the common areas, which included the Project
Property. The Settlement Agreement explicitly refers to these "concurrent rights." Given these
facts, it seems reasonable to conclude that some portion of Maple Grove's $6835 monthly rent
was attributable to parking and access on the Project Property.

D.

Maple Grove Is Entitled to Recover Relocation Costs.
ACHD claims that Maple Grove cannot recover relocation costs because it did not follow

the procedures outlined in the Idaho Highway Relocation Assistance Act, Idaho Code § 40-2001

et seq. However, 7-71 l(2) provides a separate basis for recovering relocation costs, as
recognized by this Court in Seubert: "The language in I.C. 5 7-71 1 (2)(b) ... does not preclude
an award of relocation costs." 123 Idaho at 585, 130 P.3d at 1123. Consequently, Maple

Grove's compliance with the Idaho Highway Relocation Assistance Act is immaterial.
E.

Maple Grove's Losses Were Not Prevented by Relocation.
ACHD dips into the City of McCall's playbook one last time and asserts that Maple

Grove is not entitled to business damages because it relocated its business. In support of this
proposition, ACHD cites 7-71 1(2), which provides in part: "Business damages under this
subsection shall not be awarded if the loss can reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the
business ... or for damages caused by temporary business interruption due to construction."
This argument fails for several reasons. First, a significant portion of Maple Grove's
business damages are losses incurred in the relocation process. These losses were caused by
relocation, not mitigated by it.
Second, 7-71 l(2) does not preclude recovery of all losses suffered by a relocating
business, only those losses that could reasonably have been prevented by relocation. As this
Court explained in Seubert, the statutory language "merely serves to prevent a business from
sitting on the condemned property and claiming business damages that could have been
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mitigated by relocating." 123 Idaho at 585, 130 P.3d at 1123. There is no allegation anywhere
in the record that Maple Grove engaged in such conduct; rather, ACI3D is attempting to avoid
paying business damages by arguing that Maple Grove relocated too soon.
Finally, the record reflects that Maple Grove is not merely seeking damages caused by
temporary business interruption. In his second affidavit, Dr. Klure clearly stated his concerns
about the completed project. R., Exh. 9 (Klure Second Aff., 112,3). There is no evidence in the
record to support ACHD's contention that the Project did not interfere with Maple Grove's
dental practice.8 While the nature and extent of the damage caused to Maple Grove by the
Project is an issue that has not yet been addressed, the facts of this case demonstrate that some
damage occurred. Otherwise, why would both Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure decide that Maple Grove
could no longer operate in the setting left by the Project? And, again, why did ACHD
compensate Dr. Curtis for his share of Maple Grove's business damages?
F.

Maple Grove Is Entitled to Recover Its Attorney Fees on Appeal if It Prevails in the
Action.
A condemnee is entitled to recover its attorney fees if the condemnor does not reasonably

make a timely offer of settlement of at least ninety percent of the ultimate jury verdict. Ada

County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 877, 673 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1983). This
also applies to qualifying businesses that are entitled to damages under 7-71 l(2). Seubert, 123
Idaho at 587, 130 P.3d at 1125.

ACHD cites to portions of Steve Price's Affidavit for support of this. Mr. Price's Affidavit is
devoid of any facts that would indicate expertise on the subject of dental practices. His
statements on the issue are not admissible evidence.

ACHD attempts to distance itself from these holdings by pointing out that the existence
of a taking is "a threshold issue that must be established before an inverse condemnation action
can be maintained." KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577,582,67 P.3d 56,61 (2003);
Covington v. J e f f s o n County, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828,831 (2002). However, in these

cases, this Court was merely addressing the elements of an inverse condemnation claim, not a
governmental entity's liability for attomey fees.
ACHD's primary concern appears to be that Acarrequi forces it to make a judgment call
as to whether a settlement is warranted, without the benefit of first receiving a judicial
determination. This hardly places ACHD in a unique situation. The law routinely expects
individuals and entities to determine whether a given course of action will create liability for
attomey fees. Acarrequi creates a strong incentive for government entities to carefully consider
the merits of a claim, rather than delegating that burden to the judicial system.
Therefore, upon remand, if Maple Grove prevails in this action and recovers business
damages against ACHD, then it will be entitled to its fees and costs, including those incurred this
appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 3 7-718 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B).
111.

CONCLUSION

Idaho's eminent domain statute contains the clearly expressed intent of the Idaho
Legislature to compensate established businesses that are damaged by the taking of real property
for public use. The undisputed facts in the record show that ACHD needed to acquire property at
the intersection of Ustick and Maple Grove for the Ustick widening project, including property
owned by Dr. Curtis and subject to the lease between Dr. Curtis and Maple Grove. By acquiring

the property for use in the project, ACHD triggered the application of Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) and
must compensate any qualifying business for the damages reasonably caused by the taking.
Maple Grove is a qualifying business by virtue of being located upon adjoining property owned
by Dr. Curtis. In addition, ACHD infringed upon Maple Grove's leasehold interest when it
acquired property for the Project. Maple Grove should he permitted to proceed with proof of the
damages reasonably caused by the Project.
For these reasons, Maple Grove respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand this action with the instruction that partial summary judgment be
entered in Maple Grove's favor on the issue of Maple Grove's right to recover any business
damages that it can prove were reasonably caused by the Project.

--A

DATED This

A day of March, 2010.
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
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